ABSTRACT
I.

Introduction:
There is an emerging body of economic literature that deals with the impact of fundamentalistIslamic terrorism on different outcomes of Muslim immigrants (e.g. Kaushal et al. 2007; Gautier et al. 2009; Goel 2010; Johnstan and Lordan 2011; Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012; Hanes and Machin 2012; Shannon 2012) . The literature shows increasing discrimination against Muslims as a result of terrorism (Gautier et al. 2009; Goel 2010; Hanes and Machin 2012) , and negative impacts of this discrimination on Muslim immigrants' health (Johnston and Lordan 2011) and labour market outcomes (Kaushal et al. 2007; Cornelissen and Jirjahn 2012; Shannon 2012) . The wave ended with the London bombings on July 7, 2005, which were committed by four Islamist suicide-bombers, grown up in the UK, and left 52 people dead as well as the four bombers, with over 700 more injured. The Netherlands was also affected by this wave of radical Islamic terrorism when Theo van Gogh, a famous Dutch film director, TV interviewer, and writer was murdered on November 2, 2004 by a young man of Moroccan origin who had recently converted to radical Islam. The attack received considerable media attention, and triggered a nation-wide outrage against Muslims (Gautier et al. 2009 ). In the weeks following the murder, there were several attacks on mosques and other Islamic institutions in the Netherlands 3 (Gautier et al. 2009 ).
We analyse changes in Muslim immigrants' perceived acceptance in the Netherlands, appreciation of living in the Netherlands, and the degree to which they feel at ease with Dutch natives, relative to non-Muslim immigrants, before and after the attacks. 4 We find that Muslim immigrants' perceived acceptance in Dutch society declined much more than that of non-Muslim immigrants following the terrorist attacks. Moreover, Muslims reported a declining appreciation of living in the Netherlands and social acceptance of the Dutch people, whereas other immigrants do not report a decline in these indicators of integration. This pattern is robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls such as socio-demographics, employment status, share of the respondent's ethnic group in the municipality, and length of stay in the Netherlands, among others. The pattern is also robust after controlling for selection bias. As our data consist of only two waves, and because of the relatively long period of time between the two waves, it is difficult to attribute the decline in the integration pattern of Muslims solely to terrorism (or the discrimination associated with it). Other endogenous factors may affect the speed by which different immigrant groups integrate. To check this possibility, we exploit the relatively long 3 With the exception of some terrorist conspiracies and threats, there were no high-profile terrorist attacks in Europe during the period from September 11, 2001 to March 10, 2004 (Nesser 2008 . According to the Global terrorism database (2012), the three attacks listed above represent the most significant Islamic terrorism attacks. For extensive details on the fundamentalist-Islamic terrorism in Europe over this period, see Bakker (2006, p3-4) . 4 The traditional measures of integration (e.g., language use, importance of religion, attitudes towards intramarriage) are not available in the two waves of the data. However, given that the social integration process of foreign minorities may take generations, assessing changes in immigrants' integration over a short period of time would prove difficult using the traditional measures of integration. Our measures, though not perfect measures of integration, represent the basis of the integration process, and therefore could capture the integration potential. Georgiadis and Manning (2013) show that immigrants who are treated with respect and who feel tolerated by natives are more likely to identify with the host country.
4 time frame during which data were collected in the first wave, and use the timing of interviews to estimate whether a different trend is observed in the integration pattern of Muslims, relative to non-Muslims, prior to the terrorist attacks. The analysis shows no evidence for a decline in Muslim immigrants' integration before the terrorist attacks, suggesting that the terrorist attacks did in fact affect the integration pattern of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and variables used. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy and reports the results of the data analysis. Section 5 describes the robustness checks performed, while Section 6 estimates the heterogeneity in the decline of integration across different groups of Muslim immigrants. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the findings and offers conclusions.
II.
Related studies
The exogeneity of fundamentalist-Islamic terrorist attacks has been exploited in the literature to study the impact terrorist attacks have on several outcomes of Muslim immigrants. For example, Kaushal et al. (2007) study the impact that the September 11 attacks have on the labour market outcomes of Muslims in the US, and show that those attacks did not significantly affect employment and hours worked for Arab and Muslim men, though they were associated with a temporary 9-11% decline in earnings. The impact of September 11 on the labour market outcomes of Muslim immigrants in other Western countries has been assessed. Cornelissen and Jirjahn (2012) showed that September 11 negatively affected Muslim workers in Germany, especially the low-skilled employed in small-and medium-sized firms. However, Shannon (2012) found no impact of September 11 on Muslim immigrants in the Canadian labour market .
In addition, the impact of terrorism on health outcomes of Muslim immigrants has been studied. Johnston and Lordan (2012) ranges from 1 ('strongly disagree') to 5 ('strongly agree'). The scale for items (2), (5), and (7) 'Do you feel at ease in the company of Dutch people?' The answer is on a four-point scale: 1 ('no, not at all'), 2 ('no, not really'), 3 ('yes, a little'), and 4 ('yes, very much so'). To facilitate reading and comparison of the results, we standardized the three variables. Table A1 provides an overview of all variables used in the study. The table shows The figure shows that after the terrorist attacks, integration measures declined for both groups.
However, the decrease is much more pronounced among Muslims than non-Muslims. 
Empirical model and analysis
To identify the effect that the terrorist attacks in Western Europe have on the integration of already exists before the terrorist attacks, it would be difficult to attribute the decline in the integration of Muslim immigrants to the terrorist attacks. Since the first wave of data is collected over a long time frame, it is feasible that a trend could be identified. 
V.2. Selection bias
We acknowledge the potential for selection bias due to the panel attrition in the dataset; out of the 704 respondents who answered integration questions in the first wave, only 325 continued to appear in the second wave. It is reasonable to assume that immigrants absent from the second wave of the sample would have reported lower integration than those who remained. Muslims are, on average, less likely to appear in the two waves of the survey than non-Muslims (Table   A4 ).
Since Muslims' perceived integration is affected by the terrorist attacks more than that of other immigrants, Muslims may also be more likely to drop out of the study (or even leave the country). However, this panel attrition would lead to an under-estimation of the decline in the integration of Muslim immigrants, making the actual decrease in the integration pattern of Muslims more pronounced. To account for any selection bias, we replicate the analysis using a balanced sample made up of respondents for whom we have complete information on integration in the two waves. However, there could be contemporaneous shocks that affected the participation in the second wave of the study. For example as stated earlier, those who are most affected by the terrorist event may be the least likely to participate in the second wave of the survey (or may even have left the country). For this reason, even a balanced panel estimate may not truly reflect the actual change in Muslims' integration. To correct for this, we compute a Mills ratio using a selection variable that equals 1 if the individual is observed in the two waves of the study as our dependent variable in the selection equation. Table A4 shows the estimates from the selection equation as a function of all independent variables, as well as the number of 13 missing items in respondents' answers to all questions in the first wave. 13 This variable is used to satisfy the exclusion restriction, which is possible since the chance that a respondent will be absent from the second wave should be correlated with the number of questions the respondent did not answer in the first wave of the questionnaire. That is, immigrants who answered fewer questions in the first wave should be more likely to drop out in the second wave. However, the number of missing items should not be correlated with the timing of the terrorist attacks. Table   A5 shows the RE model estimates from the balanced sample. The table shows similar results for perceived acceptance in the Netherlands and appreciation of living in the Netherlands as reported in Table 1 . However, for feeling at ease with locals, the interaction between Muslim and Second wave is no longer significant, though it has the same negative sign as before. The coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are not significant. This shows that selection bias does not motivate our results.
VI.
Heterogeneous effects
Having shown a significant decline in the integration pattern of Muslim immigrants relative to other immigrants after the wave of terrorism in Western Europe, we now investigate whether different types of immigrants have been more or less responsive to the attacks.
We examine whether there is any heterogeneity in the decline of integration with respect to gender, education, geographic concentration of immigrants with the same ethnic background, as well as labour market status. particularly Muslims living in theses geographical areas are more prone to feel the increase in discrimination related to terrorist attacks, and tend, as a result, to isolate from the rest of the society. This is, however, contradictory to the recent findings of Schüller (2012) who shows that in response to the September 11 th attacks, natives did not change their attitudes toward immigration depending on whether they live in a region with a low or high share of foreigners.
The table also shows that the effect is driven mainly by immigrants who are employed. This could be because they are the ones more prone to deal with natives, and are therefore more likely to feel discrimination. This again shows that the pattern is not driven by economic reasons.
14 In addition to the heterogeneity checks above, we also perform a heterogeneity analysis to check which characteristics of Muslims are most closely associated with a decline in attitudes towards integration. The degree of religiosity of the Muslim immigrant as well as the ethnic group to which a person belongs are the basis for this heterogeneity check. To this end, we restrict our sample to Muslim immigrants.
We assess religiosity by the frequency the respondent reports going to mosque. We create a dummy variable for being religious that takes the value 0 if the person hardly ever goes to the 14 Furthermore, there is no significant change in the actual unemployment of Muslim immigrants compared to nonMuslim immigrants after the terrorist attacks.
15
mosque and 1 if the respondent goes to the mosques on a frequent basis. Table A6 shows that religious Muslims are generally less integrated than less religious Muslims. However, the decrease in the integration of religious Muslims is significantly less pronounced than that of less religious Muslims. This could be explained by the already low integration level of religious Muslims, which makes the decline in the integration of the less religious more pronounced.
Finally, we classified Muslims according to the ethnic group to which they belong. Table   A7 shows that the decrease in integration is driven mainly by Turkish Muslims. Compared to
Moroccans and other Muslims, Turks are the least integrated, and show a significant pattern of decline in their integration.
VII.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the integration pattern of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants in the other immigrants did not report a decline in these indicators of integration. This pattern holds after including a large set of control variables such as, employment status, share of the respondent's ethnic group in the municipality, length of stay in the Netherlands, and so forth.
Our findings are also robust after accounting for selection bias, and are not driven by any existing negative trend in the integration of Muslim immigrants.
Further analysis shows that the difference between Muslim and non-Muslim integration attitudes is driven mainly by men, the highly educated, immigrants living in geographical areas with a high concentration of the same ethnic group, and those who are employed. This shows that the pattern of change cannot be attributed to economic factors, but rather to cultural factors.
We also find that among Muslims, the more religious are less integrated than the less religious.
However, the decline in the integration of the less religious is significantly more pronounced than that of the more religious. These findings show that terrorism has a stronger negative impact on the integration of Muslim immigrants who previously had strong potential for integration. 
